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Deepfake video call scams: when seeing isn't believing
Deepfake video call scams use AI to put a convincing fake of a real person, your CEO, a colleague, a relative, onto a live video call, to authorise a payment or extract money. In the most notorious case, a finance worker paid out 25 million dollars after a video meeting in which every other participant was a deepfake. The technology is now good enough that a familiar face on screen is no longer proof of anything. The defence is the same as it has always been: verify the request through a separate, trusted channel before any money moves.
Seeing is no longer believing
For all of history, seeing a person's face and hearing their voice was proof you were dealing with them. That assumption is now broken. Generative AI can place a live, interactive deepfake of a specific real person onto a video call, responding in real time, in their face and their voice. The face you recognise is no longer evidence of who you are talking to.
This is not theoretical. In a widely reported 2024 case, a finance employee at the engineering firm Arup was deceived into paying out around 25 million dollars after joining a video conference in which the chief financial officer and other colleagues were all AI-generated deepfakes. Everyone on the call except the victim was fake. The FBI has since warned that criminals are using generative AI to impersonate executives and authority figures on live video chats, precisely to pull off this kind of fraud at scale.
How the scam works
The structure is consistent across cases, whether the target is a company employee or an individual.
An impersonation of someone you trust. A boss, a finance chief, a business partner, a relative, a romantic interest. In a corporate setting it is usually an executive instructing a transfer. For an individual it may be a relative in crisis or an online partner "proving" they are real on a quick video call.
A live video or call that looks right. The deepfake carries the real person's face and voice. In group-call versions, several "colleagues" are present to make the meeting feel normal and to apply social pressure.
An urgent, confidential payment request. A time-sensitive transfer, a secret acquisition, an emergency, a problem only you can fix, quickly and quietly. The urgency and secrecy exist to stop you verifying.
A payment method that is hard to reverse. A wire or, increasingly, cryptocurrency. As the FBI puts it plainly, do not send money, gift cards, or cryptocurrency to people you do not know, and the deepfake exists precisely to make you believe you do know them.
Why it works, and why the old defence still holds
The deepfake defeats the instinct we all rely on: that a face and a voice confirm identity. Once that is gone, scrutinising the request itself is what remains, and it still works, because a deepfake controls only the channel it appears on.
The scammer can fake the CFO on the video call. They cannot answer the CFO's real phone, or pass a secret word only the real relative would know, or survive you ending the call and reaching the person through a number you already have. Verification on a second, independent channel is the one move the deepfake cannot follow you onto.
How to verify, specifically
The FBI's recommendations map directly onto this.
Agree a secret word or phrase with family, and consider an internal verification step for finance teams. A pre-agreed code that a stranger could not know and would not find online settles identity in seconds.
Hang up and call back on a number you already have, not one provided on the call. Reach the person through a channel you control.
Look for the visual flaws. Deepfakes still struggle with fine detail. Watch for distorted hands or fingers, unnatural teeth or eyes, odd blinking, hair and earrings that flicker, lighting and shadows that do not match, and a slight lag between audio and lip movement. Asking the person to turn their head fully sideways or wave a hand in front of their face can break a weaker fake.
Treat urgency and secrecy as the alarm. A genuine executive or relative can tolerate a two-minute verification. Pressure to act now and tell no one is the signal, not the exception.
Never move money on the strength of a call alone. No matter how real it looks, a payment, especially a wire or crypto transfer, waits until the request is confirmed independently.
This is the video-call sibling of the AI voice-cloning scam, and part of the broader shift we cover in AI-era scams and deepfakes.
For businesses specifically
Finance and operations teams are now a direct target, and process beats vigilance.
Require that any payment above a threshold, or any change to payment details, is confirmed through a second channel and a second person, regardless of who appears to be asking. Make it a stated, blameless rule that an instruction from a senior person on a call can and must be verified, so no employee feels they are questioning the boss by following procedure. The Arup loss happened inside exactly the gap this closes.
Red flags
- An urgent, confidential payment or data request on a video call
- A senior person instructing a transfer outside the normal process
- Pressure to act immediately and not discuss it with anyone
- A request to pay by wire or cryptocurrency
- Visual glitches: odd hands, teeth, eyes, blinking, lip-sync lag
- A reason you cannot hang up and call the person back
- A "colleague" or "relative" proving themselves on a brief, controlled video
What this guide cannot do
It cannot tell you from a screenshot whether a given call is fake, and deepfake quality is improving, so the visual tells will fade over time. What it can do is move your trust off the thing that can be faked, the face and voice, and onto the thing that cannot, independent verification. Build that habit, and the quality of the fake stops mattering.
This is general information, not legal, financial, or security advice.
Use Chain Pursuit's free tools to understand your options, preserve evidence, and identify possible recovery scams. Do not share your seed phrase or private keys with anyone.
Sources
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center, Criminals Use Generative AI to Facilitate Fraud, PSA I-120324-PSA, December 2024. https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2024/PSA241203, source for how criminals use AI to impersonate executives on live video chats, and the recommendations: a secret word with family, listening for tone, looking for visual imperfections, making accounts private, verifying by hanging up and calling back, and never sending money or crypto to people you do not know.
Reporting on the Arup deepfake case (multiple outlets, 2024), on the approximately 25 million dollar loss following a video conference in which colleagues were AI-generated deepfakes. We present the figure as reported.
Federal Trade Commission, Scammers Use AI to Enhance Their Family Emergency Schemes. https://consumer.ftc.gov/consumer-alerts/2023/03/scammers-use-ai-enhance-their-family-emergency-schemes, on AI impersonation and verifying independently.
Deepfake capability is advancing quickly; the visual tells described here are reliable as of October 2026 but will weaken over time, which is why independent verification is the durable defence. Reviewed quarterly.
Frequently asked questions
Can scammers really fake a live video call of someone I know?
Yes. Generative AI can place an interactive deepfake of a specific person's face and voice onto a live call, responding in real time. In a 2024 case, a worker paid out about 25 million dollars after a video meeting where the other participants were all deepfakes. A familiar face on screen is no longer proof of identity.
How can I tell if a video call is a deepfake?
Look for visual flaws: distorted hands or fingers, unnatural teeth or eyes, odd blinking, flickering hair, mismatched lighting, and a lag between audio and lip movement. Asking the person to turn their head fully sideways or wave a hand across their face can break a weaker fake. But the surest test is to hang up and call them back on a known number.
What's the single best defence?
Verify the request through a separate, trusted channel before any money moves. Hang up and call back on a number you already have, or use a pre-agreed secret word. A deepfake controls only the call in front of you, so reaching the real person another way defeats it regardless of how convincing the fake looks.
My boss asked me on a video call to make an urgent, secret payment. What do I do?
Do not pay on the strength of the call. Confirm it through a second channel and ideally a second person, even though it feels awkward to question a senior request. Urgency and secrecy are the hallmarks of this fraud. A real executive can tolerate a short verification; the Arup loss happened in exactly this situation.
Should my company have a rule for this?
Yes. Require any large payment or change of payment details to be confirmed through a second channel and a second person, regardless of who appears to be asking. Make verification a blameless, stated policy so employees do not feel they are challenging the boss by following it. Process closes the gap that vigilance alone cannot.
Are deepfake scams only aimed at companies?
No. Individuals are targeted too, often through a relative in crisis or an online romantic interest who "proves" they are real on a brief video call. The same rules apply: verify on a separate channel, use a family secret word, and never send money or crypto based on a video alone.
Will the visual tells always work?
No. Deepfake quality is improving, and the glitches in hands, eyes, and lip-sync will become harder to spot. That is exactly why you should not rely on spotting the fake. Move your trust to independent verification, which works no matter how good the deepfake becomes.
I already paid after a deepfake call. What now?
Act fast. For a wire, call your bank's fraud department and ask for a recall. For crypto, preserve all details and report immediately. File with ic3.gov and, for a business, alert your bank and internal security at once. Then expect a possible recovery scam and never pay an upfront fee to get it back.
Pressured on a video call to move money?
Eleven questions to help you verify before you act, and report it if you already paid.
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